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ABSTRACT 
by 
James Digby 
 
This paper analyses the deployment of counter-narratives on social media as part 
of counter violent extremism (CVE) strategies aimed at degrading Islamic State’s ability 
to recruit foreign fighters and inspire attacks abroad. It argues that the bulk of counter-
narrative content emerges out of a small network of NGOs, think-tanks and 
organizations based in London which is conceptualized as a lattice. The quantity of 
counter-narrative content emerging from this lattice and elsewhere, whilst significant, 
is vastly mismatched by the scale of Islamic State content produced at their operational 
apex, and is frequently overestimated by policy papers and CVE reports from social 
media companies. Successful counter-narrative campaigns – identified by their 
adherence to academic communications theory and prevalence within CVE policy 
spheres – demonstrate the need for religious narratives in which normative Islam plays 
an active yet embedded role in modern societies outside of the so-called caliphate. 
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Cartoons vs. the Caliphate: The Scale of 
Counter-Narrative Campaigns and the Role 
of Religion 
 
“Average Mohamed asks: what do you think your job description is when 
you join Islamic State? 
Your job description is to commit genocide against Muslims, Christians, 
Yazidi and Jews; terrorise innocent women, men and children like your family 
into blind obedience; behead unarmed, innocent people you round up; destroy 
world heritage sites, mosques, tombs and shrines; empower unelected, self-
nominated, murderous, blood-thirsty, individuals as leaders. 
Not exactly Disney World, or action-film like the propaganda says it is, is it? 
Remember: peace up, and extremist thinking, especially Islamic State, out.  
This message is brought to you by averagemohamed.com.”1 
 
Average Mohamed is a series of short cartoon videos about the teachings of 
Islam, the barbarity of terrorism, Islamic State, and Muslim identity in the West. They 
are the creation of Mohamed Amin Ahmed, a Somali-American living in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, who uploads his content to YouTube. The central character is the 
eponymous Mohamed, a smiling middle-aged man with a comfortable paunch who 
                                                          
1 Average Mohamed, ‘Islamic State Job Description’, YouTube, 5th September 2014. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vJ-SlxjRrQ. Accessed 11th June 2018. 
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ends each video with the same invocation: “Remember, kids: peace up; extremist 
thinking out. This message is brought to you by averagemohamed.com.”2 
 
Abdullah X is a similar series of YouTube videos and online content, this time 
created by a British Muslim who prefers anonymity. In interviews, he has stated that 
he was once tempted by narratives of violent extremism and wants to steer Muslim 
youth away from that path.3 The videos are narrated by Abdullah X, a sharp-featured 
young character with chunky headphones around his neck, graffiti on the walls 
behind him, and a thick London accent.4 They deal frankly with questions of Muslim 
identity in the UK, depictions of Muslims in the media, the Syrian civil war, normative 
Muslim values, and the Islamic State. For instance, in the following extract from a 
two-part video, Abdullah X is transported to Islamic State territory which he 
compares to Medina in the time of the Prophet: 
 
“What the YouTubes is happening here? … I don’t recall learning about 
non-Muslims and Muslims being murdered in cold blood for being – what? – aid 
workers, givers of charity, helpers. Were not the people of Medina called ‘The 
Helpers’, ‘the Ansar’? In Medina, were minorities not protected? Were people not 
free to practice their religion? Was it not a place where freed slaves came to live, 
and be free, and not become slaves all over again? Servants of Allah, yeah, but 
not of the corrupt desire of thugs and power-driven sociopaths. What kind of 
                                                          
2 https://www.youtube.com/user/1mohamedamin/videos. Accessed 11th June 2018. 
3 Atika Shubert & Florence Davey-Attlee, ‘‘Abdullah X:’ Former extremist’s cartoon aims to stop young 
Muslims joining ISIS’, CNN, 7th October 2014. 
4 https://www.youtube.com/user/abdullahx/videos. Accessed 11th June 2018. 
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‘Islamic State’ is this warzone? This is their representation of that Sunnah? 
Nothing feels right about this, man: from the name, to the deeds of those acting 
in its name, nothing. It’s a state all right, trust.”5 
 
Both Average Mohamed’s and Abdullah X’s channels have an average view count 
of a few thousand per video. These numbers are not insignificant; nor are they 
staggering. But their YouTube channels have both received significant political 
attention from the highest echelons of Western governments. Average Mohamed was 
spoken about at a White House counter-violent extremism (CVE) summit in the USA, 
and Abdullah X was referenced extensively in a British House of Commons report on 
counter-extremism in the UK.6 They are examples of ‘counter-narratives’, campaigns 
and content designed to challenge or disrupt the narratives of Islamic State and other 
extremist organizations on social media. Average Mohamed and Abdullah X’s content 
is located right at the center of a lattice of funding, policies, and research which 
conceptualizes counter-narratives as an effective foil to Islamic State’s media jihad. 
Most of the work in this lattice is done by a select group of NGOs and think-tanks, 
though it stretches right up to social media giants and multilateral political 
institutions, and right down to grassroots content producers and activists. 
 
                                                          
5 Abdullah X, ‘Abdullah X: ‘Journey Through Mankind’ Part 2 of 2’, YouTube, 13th February 2015. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ae3mupy4cXo. Accessed 11th June 2018. 
6 Tanya Silverman, Christopher J. Stewart, Zahed Amanullah, & Jonathan Birdwell, ‘The Impact of 
Counter-Narratives: Insights from a year-long cross-platform pilot study of counter-narrative curation, 
targeting, evaluation and impact’, The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), 2016, p. 12, & House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping 
point’, Eighth Report of Session 2016-17, 2016. 
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This study is the result of five months spent in London from September 2017 to 
January 2018 talking to the NGOs and think-tanks mentioned in the paper. I visited 
their offices, read their research output, attended their conferences, and mapped 
their operations. I am grateful for the support they showed me along the way, and 
deeply respectful of the important work which they are doing. 
 
This paper is divided into three parts. The first weaves together the main 
strands which emerged in 2017 to empower counter-narrative theory and practice in 
the UK and beyond (particularly Europe and North America). It explains the threat 
that Islamic State posed from 2014 to 2018, how their social media propaganda 
operated, and the measures which social media companies and governments took to 
try and dismantle this online threat. It finally notes how, in the context of repeated 
attacks and boiling public pressure, counter-narrative theory emerged out of policy 
recommendations and civil society practice to gain a prominent position in counter-
violent extremism (CVE) discourse. 
 
The second section is a quantitative analysis of the scale of counter-narratives 
operating globally. It argues that the emphasis placed on counter-narratives in CVE 
discourse is wildly disproportionate to the actual amount of counter-narrative 
content circulating online. Literature reviews list a dizzying array of multinational 
institutions and international NGOs which are involved in counter-narrative work, yet 
their levels of substantive output and public engagement are extremely unclear. The 
bulk of accessible counter-narrative content is linked to a small lattice of NGOs, 
organizations and think-tanks in London, led by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
(ISD). Policy papers promoting counter-narratives consistently recycle the same 
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examples of counter-narratives (such as Average Mohamed and Abdullah X) whilst 
making the unverifiable claim that they are singular examples of a much larger 
phenomenon. Social media companies reach to the lattice for help with specific 
counter-narrative efforts, which they sometimes casuistically promote to 
governments and the public as long-running strategies. Ultimately, the scale of 
counter-narratives would need to be radically enlarged to provide an adequate 
counter-messaging response to the vast swathes of propaganda being pushed out 
online by Islamic State at its operational apex. 
 
The third section offers some qualitative reflections on the content of successful 
counter-narrative content. The scale of counter-narratives notwithstanding, there is 
empirical evidence showing that campaigns designed to create links between the 
audience targeted by Islamic State propaganda and the society which the propaganda 
aims to alienate or isolate them from can be effective in diverting or reversing 
radicalization trajectories. Islamic State propaganda, and other Salafi-jihadist content, 
offers a powerful moral, epistemological, and social vision in which the world is 
bifurcated into two camps. This vision is religious in that it is mediated by religious 
frames of reference and shot through with religious terminologies, arguments, and 
even aesthetics. Counter-narratives which can retain the powerful appeal of the 
religious vison while contesting the binary worldview of ‘us vs. them’ can achieve 
counter-messaging goals. The way that this most often and most effectively plays out 
in practice is for the content to be created by authentically religious actors who have 
a vision of normative Islam which is embedded in Western societies, and this can be 
demonstrated by looking at some successful counter-narrative campaigns and the 
messages they send. 
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1. The Emergence of Counter-Narrative Theory 
ISIS’s Online Ecosystem 
2014, the year that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of the 
Islamic State caliphate out of the blood and rubble of fallen Mosul, was – according to 
Charlie Winter, probably the foremost analyst of Islamic State’s media industry – ‘the 
year in which Salafi-jihadist propaganda went mainstream’.7 ISIS-branded 
productions were plastered across Western newspapers, network television and 
social media, where they would remain for the next few years. This fixation is 
understandable. The group had swept from relative obscurity in geopolitical terms to 
a position of startling military and economic power. At the height of their insurgency 
from 2014 to 2015, ISIS controlled a stretch of land roughly the size of Britain in Iraq 
and Syria, with an estimated population of 12 million.8 They ruled ancient cities in the 
Levant with an iron grip, and claimed provinces in at least 16 other countries from 
West Africa to South Asia. This position was ultimately untenable, and as intelligence 
assets and military understandings of their operations grew, the group was forced 
back in persistent offensives which stripped Islamic State of the bulk of their 
territory.9 In 2018, ISIS can only claim to hold a fraction of their former self-
proclaimed caliphate, with the main cities – Ramadi, Raqqa, Fallujah, and Mosul – 
liberated in bloody and destructive battles. 
                                                          
7 Charlie Winter, ‘Apocalypse, later: a longitudinal study of the Islamic State brand’, 2018, p. 103. 
8 Rukmini Callimachi, ‘The ISIS Files: When Terrorists Run City Hall’, The New York Times, 4th – 5th 
April 2018. 
9 Charlie Winter, ‘Apocalypse, later: a longitudinal study of the Islamic State brand’, 2018, p. 104. 
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Islamic State has been exceptionally successful at manufacturing an image of 
itself as a looming – even existential – threat. It intentionally courted front-page 
headlines and airtime as part of a coordinated system of media proliferation.10 Winter 
calls its media operations ‘unparalleled in their scope and sophistication’, and notes 
that they revolutionized many aspects of insurgent communication and 
propaganda.11 ISIS uses the internet – particularly social media – to interact with 
followers, enemies, and potential recruits using thousands of messages in multiple 
languages.12 Their media offices routinely publish photos, videos, magazines and text 
updates about Islamic State’s activities featuring a carefully controlled concoction of 
civil order and extreme violence.13 Whilst Western media focused on shocking 
broadcasts such as the murders of James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines, Alan 
Henning, Abdul-Rahman Kassig and others, or the gruesome Clash of Swords video 
series in 2014, ISIS was churning out literally thousands of media products in what 
Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger refer to as a ‘propaganda tsunami’ in which ‘bloody 
weeks turned into bloody months’.14  
 
ISIS was not the first Salafi-jihadist group to produce such gruesome materials – 
al-Qaeda and others have been making content since the Soviet-Afghan war in the 
                                                          
10 Charlie Winter, ‘Apocalypse, later: a longitudinal study of the Islamic State brand’, 2018, p. 103. 
11 Charlie Winter, ‘Apocalypse, later: a longitudinal study of the Islamic State brand’, 2018, p. 105. 
12 Kurt Braddock & John Horgan, ‘Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating 
Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism’, 2016, p. 394. 
13 Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 2015, pp. 113 – 114. 
14 Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 2015, pp. 122 – 124. 
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1980s – but the production value and dissemination methods ISIS employed were 
novel.15 Their videos were often produced by experienced professionals and featured 
fast-paced editing, music, charismatic narration, and consistent storytelling.16 Their 
blend of audio-visual materials disseminated globally online is used to create 
persistent and ideologically coherent chains of propaganda intended to attract 
foreign fighters and portray an appearance of strength.17 
 
ISIS opened its first official Twitter account in October 2013.18 A year later, at its 
operational zenith, Islamic State was publishing around 200 propaganda events a 
week, ranging from photograph reports, documenting videos and radio bulletins to 
poetry.19 Winter found that in one month in 2015, ‘IS’s official propagandists created 
and disseminated 1,146 separate units of propaganda. Photo essays, videos, audio 
statements, radio bulletins, text round-ups, magazines, posters, pamphlets, 
theological treatises – the list goes on’ in multiple languages.20 These products were 
uploaded to social media – primarily Twitter – where they were circulated by a 
swirling mob of semi-anonymous global supporters sometimes referred to as the 
‘media mujahideen’ aided by algorithms and other computational devices designed to 
                                                          
15 Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 2015, pp. 101 – 103. 
16 ‘RAN Issue Paper: Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives’, RAN Centre of Excellence, 2015. 
17 Ali Fisher, ‘Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence’, 2015; Jessica 
Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, p. 112. 
18 Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 2015, p. 154. 
19 Charlie Winter, ‘Inside the collapse of Islamic State’s propaganda machine’, Wired UK, 20th December 
2017. 
20 Charlie Winter, ‘Fishing and Ultraviolence’, BBC News, 6th October 2015. 
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extend their reach and evade deletion.21 J.M. Berger launched a large-scale 
assessment of ISIS’s Twitter following in 2014 – 2015 and found that over 46,000 
Twitter accounts supporting the organization were in use at one point.22 This online 
ecosystem was centrally controlled by arguably the most complex non-state media 
operation in history: ISIS ran 5 media foundations with at least 35 affiliated stations 
across the Levant, Maghreb and Sinai Peninsula.23 
 
This propaganda system is part of an explicit strategy, as stated by ISIS 
operatives themselves. Excerpts from ‘Media operative, you are also a mujahid’ 
analysed by Haroro Ingram illustrate this point: ‘The media is jihad in the way of 
Allah’, it reads. ‘You, with your media work, are therefore a mujahid in the way of 
Allah … Some criticize media operatives for engaging in verbal jihad whilst sat on 
sofas in beautiful houses … But by Allah no, they are at the forefront of the conflict, in 
the heart of the war, within the furnace of its battles … All things considered, it is no 
exaggeration to say that the media operative is a martyrdom-seeker without a belt!’24 
A member of ISIS’s social media team is on record saying, ‘This is a war of ideologies 
as much as it is a physical war. And just as the physical war must be fought on the 
battlefield, so too must the ideological war be fought in the media.’25 Charlie Winter 
analysed the same document, highlight passages such as, ‘Anyone who knows the 
                                                          
21 See, for instance, Martyn Frampton, Ali Fisher, & Nico Prucha, ‘The New Netwar: Countering 
Extremism Online’, Policy Exchange, 2017. 
22 J.M. Berger, ‘Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy’, 2015. 
23 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens & Nick Kaderbhai, ‘Research Perspectives on Online Radicalisation: A 
Literature Review, 2006 – 2016’, VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017, p. 38. 
24 Haroro Ingram, ‘Islamic State’s English-language magazines, 2014-2017: Trends & implications for 
CT-CVE strategic communications’, ICCT, 2018. 
25 Jessica Stern & J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, 2015, p. 147. 
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Crusaders of today and keeps track of that which infuriates them understands how 
they are angered and terrorised by jihadi media. They – the curse of Allah the 
Almighty be on them – know its importance, impact and significance more than any 
others!’ Therefore, if launched effectively, ‘media weapons [can] actually be more 
potent than autonomic bombs’ and have ‘far-reaching potential to change the balance 
in respect to the war between the Muslims and their enemies’. Winter concludes that 
ISIS considers messaging one of its most important weapons, and the primary method 
by which ISIS extends its influence outside of its physical territory in Iraq and Syria.26 
 
However the Islamic State’s territorial apex has passed, the result of sustained 
military losses and ever-tightening controls by the coalition of nations and forces 
arrayed against them. Its caliphate has been shattered into a system of 
interconnected statelets in Syria and Iraq, and many of its key operatives and 
operating centers have been obliterated.27 This has affected its media operations. 
There is no clear consensus on whether Islamic State’s media operations are 
undergoing a full-fledged collapse or have been shifting to more covert channels 
giving a false indication of decline, though the numbers certainly appear to point to a 
significant decrease in ISIS’s media productivity.28 Three-quarters of their media 
outlets were silenced by December 2017, and most analytics show that their mean 
                                                          
26 Charlie Winter, ‘Media Jihad: The Islamic State’s Doctrine for Information Warfare’, The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), 2016. 
27 See, for instance, Charlie Winter & Jade Parker, ‘Virtual Caliphate Rebooted: The Islamic State’s 
Evolving Online Strategy’, Lawfare, 7th January 2018. 
28 For an argument that Islamic State’s media has undergone a ‘full-fledged collapse’, see Charlie 
Winter & Jade Parker, ‘Virtual Caliphate Rebooted: The Islamic State’s Evolving Online Strategy’, 
Lawfare, 7th January 2018. In contrast, Frampton, Fisher & Prucha argue that ISIS’s output has not 
declined in the way that popular wisdom suggests: Martyn Frampton, Ali Fisher, & Nico Prucha, ‘The 
New Netwar: Countering Extremism Online’, Policy Exchange, 2017, pp. 59 – 63. 
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output has reduced by over half.29 The quality of material has also suffered: high-
quality videos have been replaced with cruder clips, and utopian presentations of the 
caliphate have given way to defiant depictions of combat alone. ISIS has not only run 
out of operatives and media centers to create their content – they have run out of civil 
order and military victories to create it about.30 
 
The Response in the UK and Beyond 
The period of time from the announcement of the caliphate in 2014 and the 
current state of play in 2018 has been one of considerable panic in Europe, the Middle 
East and North Africa, and North America as countries worry about ISIS’s ability to 
recruit foreign nationals to swell its ranks and launch terrorist attacks in their 
homelands. 
 
Islamic State attracted somewhere in the region of 25,000 – 30,000 foreign 
fighters, mainly from Middle Eastern nations, with 4,000 – 5,000 coming from the 
West. In Europe, particularly large numbers travelled from France, Germany and the 
UK, and disproportionately large numbers relative to the overall populations of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden also made the journey.31 The role of 
the internet and social media in convincing British and other youths to choose to join 
                                                          
29 See: Charlie Winter, ‘Inside the collapse of Islamic State’s propaganda machine’, Wired UK, 20th 
December 2017; ‘Analysis: Islamic State media output goes into sharp decline’, BBC Monitoring, 23rd 
November 2017; Charlie Winter, ‘Apocalypse, later: a longitudinal study of the Islamic State brand’, 
2018, p. 107. 
30 Charlie Winter, ‘Inside the collapse of Islamic State’s propaganda machine’, Wired UK, 20th December 
2017. 
31 Lorne Dawson & Amarnath Amarasingam, ‘Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations 
for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq’, 2016. 
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the extremist group is contested: Rachel Bryson makes a convincing case for the 
existence of offline radicalization hubs in the UK (she found that two thirds of British 
jihadis had links to just 6 individuals), and Peter Neumann and Shiraz Maher argue 
through their study of nearly 800 Western recruits that the ‘decisive factor’ 
transitioning people from terrorist sympathisers to foreign fighters is offline social 
networks.32 However they concede that social media plays a role in the radicalization 
process, which is explained in detail by J.M. Berger’s assessment of social media 
grooming of potential fighters: recruiters trawl Muslim networks looking for targets, 
before isolating individuals within an online micro-community and shifting their 
conversation onto private communication where they encourage emigration.33 
 
As ISIS started suffering irreparably serious military defeats in Syria and Iraq, 
their message began to morph. They spent less energy recruiting fighters to travel 
abroad, and increasingly looked to incite terrorist attacks in their correspondents’ 
home countries, offering logistics, instructions, and encouragement.34 Between June 
2014 (the declaration of the caliphate) and June 2017, there were 51 successful 
terrorist attacks in Europe and North America by individuals directly controlled by 
ISIS, connected to ISIS, or inspired by ISIS. These attacks killed 395 people and 
injured 1,549.35 
                                                          
32 Rachel Bryson, ‘For Caliph and Country: Exploring how British jihadis join a global movement’, Tony 
Blair Institute for Global Change, 2017; Peter Neumann & Shiraz Maher, ‘London attack: How are UK 
extremists radicalised?’, BBC News, 5th June 2018. 
33 J.M. Berger, ‘Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy’, CTC Sentinel, 
Vol. 8, No. 10, 2015. 
34 Charlie Winter, ‘Inside the collapse of Islamic State’s propaganda machine’, Wired UK, 20th December 
2017. 
35 Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone & Eva Entenmann, ‘Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and 
Jihadist Attacks in the West’, ICCT, 2017, p. 151. 
13 
 
 
In the UK, these attacks were clustered in 2017. The country had suffered a 
terrible assault in 2005, when four bombers targeted public transport in London, 
killing 52 and injuring 700 in the so-called ‘7/7 bombings’. Another prominent 
jihadist attack came in 2013 when a British soldier, Fusilier Lee Rigby, was run over 
and decapitated in London whilst fundraising for a veterans’ charity. The spate of 
attacks in 2017 started on 22nd March 2017, when Khaled Masood drove a car into 
pedestrians on Westminster Bridge and stormed the Palace of Westminster, stabbing 
a policemen; he killed 5 people and injured 49. On May 22nd, Salman Abedi detonated 
a suicide bomb at an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, killing 22 and injuring 250 
(most of whom were children or teenagers). Under two weeks later, a van was used to 
run down pedestrians on London Bridge, before the occupants rushed out and started 
slashing people at random; they killed 8 people and injured 48. Later that month, 
Darren Osborne drove a van into Muslim worshippers in Finsbury Park as a self-
proclaimed racially-motivated revenge attack. And in September a bomb only 
partially exploded on the London Underground at Parsons Green station, injuring 30. 
Reports circulated that these attacks, combined with at least 7 other ‘significant plots’ 
which had been foiled by police and intelligence services, made 2017 ‘the most 
sustained period of terror activity in England since the IRA bombing campaign of the 
1970s’.36 Pundits were blunt: ‘this is the new normal’ wrote Shiraz Maher in the New 
Statesman, and the official threat level flickered between the two highest categories 
of ‘SEVERE’ and ‘CRITICAL’.37 
                                                          
36 Dominic Casciani, ‘Parsons Green: What do the police do next?’, BBC News, 16th September 2017. 
37 Shiraz Maher, ‘Parsons Green, and why more attacks on the West by Islamic State are inevitable’, 
New Statesman, 22nd September 2017; https://www.mi5.gov.uk/threat-levels – the threat level was 
14 
 
 
In the midst of the atmosphere of fear and crisis developing in Britain, Prime 
Minister Theresa May made a speech the day after the London Bridge attack. She 
called all the recent attacks ‘connected in one important sense’, saying ‘They are 
bound together by the single, evil ideology of Islamist extremism that preaches 
hatred, sows division, and promotes sectarianism … It is an ideology that is a 
perversion of Islam and a perversion of the truth. Defeating this ideology is one of the 
great challenges of our time.’38 Here she was on well-worn ground: the previous 
Prime Minister, David Cameron, gave a speech in July 2015, in which he argued that 
the central threat – over socioeconomic grievances or geopolitical rivalries – is Salafi-
jihadism itself: ‘What we are fighting, in Islamist extremism, is an ideology. It is an 
extreme doctrine.’39 UK counter-terrorism strategy had been concerned with terrorist 
ideology since the advent of CONTEST, the controversial policy inaugurated in the 
2000s and amended in 2010/11 explicitly to ‘confront the extremist ideology at the 
heart of the threat we face’.40 But Theresa May in 2017 went further in her diagnosis 
of the context of the problem: she blamed the internet. 
 
The Home Affairs Select Committee had previously blamed internet and social 
media companies on two occasions. They ran an inquiry from August 2015 to July 
                                                                                                                                                                                
raised from ‘SUBSTANTIAL’ to ‘SEVERE’ in August 2014, and it has not dipped below since. This date, 
of course, coincides with the establishment of Islamic State as a potent terrorist force. Accessed 20th 
May 2018. 
38 Kate Samuelson, ‘Read Prime Minister Theresa May’s Full Speech on the London Bridge Attack’, 
Time, 4th June 2017. 
39 Prime Minister’s Office, ‘Extremism: PM Speech’, Gov.UK, 2015. 
40 Samuel Rascoff, ‘Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization’, 2012, 
pp. 150 – 152. 
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2016, resulting in a report called ‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and 
identifying the tipping point’ in which they argued that ‘the internet has transformed 
the way that terrorist organisations can influence and radicalise people’, and accused 
social media companies of ‘consciously failing to combat the use of their sites to 
promote terrorism and killings.41 Their next inquiry, launched in July 2016, called 
‘Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online’ was more scathing, saying ‘The 
biggest and richest social media companies are shamefully far from taking sufficient 
action to tackle illegal and dangerous content, to implement proper community 
standards or keep their users safe … the major social media companies are big 
enough, rich enough and clever enough to sort this problem out’.42 It examined 
YouTube (owned by Google), Twitter and Facebook, calling each of them ‘shamefully 
irresponsible’ for allowing extreme content to saturate their sites.43 So there was 
significant political momentum underpinning Theresa May’s words in July 2017 when 
she said ‘we cannot allow this ideology the safe space it needs to breed. Yet that is 
precisely what the internet – and the big companies that provide internet-based 
services – provide.’44 Over the coming months, her and her administration incessantly 
called for internet companies to take a greater share of responsibility for counter-
terrorism measures and be subject to tighter controls.  
 
                                                          
41 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying 
the tipping point’, Eighth Report of Session 2016-17, 2016. 
42 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, ‘Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online’, 
Fourteenth Report of Session 2016-17, 2017. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Kate Samuelson, ‘Read Prime Minister Theresa May’s Full Speech on the London Bridge Attack’, 
Time, 4th June 2017. 
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Just over a week after her speech, May announced a commitment with the 
French President Emmanuel Macron to increase the legal responsibility of online 
operators.45 In September 2017 May called on the UN General Assembly to make the 
fight against terrorists and ‘the ideologies that drive them’ the theme of next year’s 
Assembly, and called on technology companies to do more to stop ‘the increasing 
numbers being drawn to extremist ideologies not only in places riven by conflict and 
instability, but many online in their homes thousands of miles away from those 
conflicts.’46 At the same summit, May, Macron and Italy’s Paul Gentiloni met with 
Google, Facebook and Microsoft and urged them to take down terrorist content 
within two hours.47 The government’s offensive on technology companies grew in 
volume and public attention; by December 2017 the security Ben Wallace was 
slamming tech firms for not removing radical content more speedily, saying, ‘Because 
content is not taken down as quickly as they could do, we’re having to de-radicalize 
people who have been radicalized. That’s costing millions … we should stop 
pretending that because they sit on beanbags in T-shirts they are not ruthless 
profiteers.’48 The government started calling for access to end-to-end encrypted 
platforms such as WhatsApp, and multiple proposals for fines on companies which 
hosted terrorist content were floated.49 May made further calls for the automatic 
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removal of content in Davos at the World Economic Forum, January 2018, whilst 
Germany passed a law fining tech companies up to €50 million if they failed to delete 
illegal material from their platforms.50 The Home Office announced in February that 
they had developed their own technology which could automatically detect 94% of 
ISIS propaganda ‘with 99.995% accuracy’ to be used on ‘any platform’.51 Most 
recently, in March 2018 the European Commission proposed non-binding EU 
legislation requiring terrorist content to be removed by online operators within one 
hour of being flagged by local law enforcement or Europol.52 
 
To summarise, the concern with ‘extremist’ or ‘Islamist’ ideology remained 
entrenched in the government’s thinking, and was only compounded by the spate of 
attacks which rocked the UK in 2017. However the focus of the spaces in which this 
ideology was to be contested shifted from local communities, schools, streets, and 
mosques where it had been located in earlier counter-terrorism strategies. These 
places were still noted as important areas of contestation, but the gaze of the 
government, media, and civil society had shifted to the internet and social media, 
particularly the social media ‘giants’: Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. 
 
Detection and Deletion 
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In many ways, they were behind the curve on this. In keeping with the social 
media trends of everybody else, jihadists and supporters opened accounts on the 
major social media platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, and these were 
their preferred mediums when Islamic State burst onto the scene.53 Facebook had 
been aggressively deleting terrorist accounts and profiles since 2009, making it a 
hostile environment for ISIS accounts and supporters who moved most of their 
accounts from Facebook to Twitter and uploaded videos to YouTube in 2014.54 Public 
awareness and pressure about Islamic State actors on social media mounted after the 
declaration of the caliphate: Facebook routinely knocked down pages, groups and 
users; YouTube responded quickly to reports of terrorist videos but did not deploy 
large-scale technical tools against them at this stage; Twitter tried to sit out the 
debate from a stoic position of free speech defence, but by the end of 2014 was forced 
to start suspensions which quickly escalated and have remained high in the years 
since.55 Twitter was once the most obvious gateway to the Islamic State online scene, 
but it was slowly replaced by Telegram (established in August 2013) as the social 
media platform of choice for Islamic State actors and supporters.56 
 
Brian Fishman, a counter-terrorism academic and practitioner hired by 
Facebook in 2016 as their Counterterrorism Policy Manager, responded to 
accusations levelled by the UK Home Affairs Select Committee in 2017 that social 
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media companies were ‘shamefully far’ from taking action: he acknowledged that 
there was a learning period, but retorted, ‘from my vantage point, it’s clear 
technology companies across the industry are treating the problem of terrorist 
content online seriously. Now we need to work constructively across the industry and 
with external partners to figure out how to do that job better.’57 In the recent context 
of increased scrutiny and regular bashing in government and media publications in 
the UK and abroad, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have all made increased efforts at 
censoring and deleting terrorist content, and they make sure that these efforts are 
publicized. VOX-Pol, an EU Programme dedicated to researching violent online 
political extremism, described 2017 as ‘[s]omewhat of a turning point … with major 
tech companies displaying an increased willingness to take down certain content 
from their platforms.’58 
 
Facebook released a series of blog posts from Brian Fishman and Monika 
Bickert (Head of Product Policy and Counterterrorism) called ‘Hard Questions’ 
explaining their approach to tackling extremist content. The first, from June 2017 
subtitled ‘How We Counter Terrorism’, detailed the artificial intelligence processes 
they have been using to detect terrorist content for deletion, which range from image 
matching and language processing to targeting terrorist clusters.59 The second, ‘Are 
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We Winning the War on Terrorism Online?’ from November 2018 noted that this AI 
approach is ‘showing promise … 99% of the ISIS and Al Qaeda-related terror content 
that we remove from Facebook is content we detect before anyone in the community 
has flagged it to us, and in some cases, before it goes live on the site’.60 In the latest 
post, ‘How Effective is Technology in Keeping Terrorists off Facebook?’ from April 
2018, they wrote that they had updated their detection technology to focus on ISIS, al-
Qaeda and affiliated groups’ material, and grown their counterterrorism team to 200 
people. During the first quarter of 2018, they removed just under 1.9 million pieces of 
terrorist content, which was largely detected automatically or picked up by internal 
reviewers. The median time a piece of newly uploaded content remained on Facebook 
was under a minute, and they developed tools for detecting old content, removing 
around 600,000 pieces.61 
 
YouTube’s CEO, Susan Wojcicki, wrote a blog post in December 2017 noting that 
YouTube started using machine-learning technology to automatically detect violent 
extremist videos in June 2017. In the six months since, YouTube had removed over 
150,000 videos. 98% of them are now being flagged by algorithms, and 70% are 
removed within 8 hours of upload.62 YouTube also confirmed in November 2017 a 
new policy which banned videos from persons or groups designated as terrorists by 
the US or UK governments, even if they lacked any explicit violence or hate speech. 
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This led to hundreds of videos of the Yemeni-born preacher Anwar al-Awlaki being 
removed, such as his lectures on the history of Islam.63 
 
Twitter released figures in April 2018 about their suspension rates of terrorist-
linked accounts: over 1.2 million accounts were suspended from August 2015 to 
December 2017 for promotion of terrorism. In the 6 months from July 2017, 93% of 
accounts suspended were flagged by internal tools, and 74% were suspended before 
they even sent their first tweet. Annual suspensions are decreasing, which they 
attribute to the ‘positive, significant impact of years of hard work making our site an 
undesirable place for those seeking to promote terrorism’.64 
 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and Microsoft came together in December 2016 to 
develop a shared industry database of ‘hashes’ – unique digital fingerprints for photos 
and videos – for terrorist content, designed to aid the development of detection 
algorithms. According to Monika Bickert in January 2018, this database now contains 
over 40,000 hashes and the consortium has grown to 12 companies.65  In June 2017, 
with help from the UK Home Office, the four original partners announced the launch 
of the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) which aims to share best 
practices for countering terrorist groups on social media platforms. They have held 
working sessions with well over 50 companies internationally, but the hashes 
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database is still touted as the primary product from this partnership, implying that 
few other concrete products have emerged.66 
 
The drive to take down terrorist content has often been likened to a game of 
‘whack-a-mole’ where deleted content inevitably reappears somewhere else. Whilst 
J.M. Berger and others have shown in a number of empirical studies that suspension 
and suppression of terrorist accounts and content lead to reductions in overall 
activity and dampens their reach, there is little doubt that much activity migrates to 
platforms with less stringent policing mechanisms.67 ISIS actors and supporters 
typically now use Telegram channels as a platform to engage with interested 
outsiders and ‘refer’ to content which is still hosted on an array of mainstream sites 
including Twitter, Google, and Facebook.68 A host of other, less prominent, file, text 
and video websites as well as traditional websites are still also nodes of 
propaganda.69 
 
A secretive cyber-war is being waged on ISIS’s online branches through 
organizations such as the US military’s Cyber Command Joint Task Force Ares and 
Europol. Sustained attacks, combined with ad-hoc offensives launched by volunteer 
hacking groups, in the context of social media clampdowns on terrorist material is 
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having a demonstrable impact on ISIS’s ability to promote itself online.70 But it has 
not scrubbed the internet of the problem. A recent example of whack-a-moling 
illustrates this point: the cyber divisions of the UK, USA, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
France, the Netherlands and Romania under Europol launched a combined assault on 
ISIS’s online media portal Amaq on the 25th March 2018. It successfully downed the 
portal, leading Europol to claim, ‘[w]ith this ground-breaking operation we have 
punched a big hole in the capability of IS to spread propaganda online and radicalise 
young people in Europe … Today's international take-down action, with the support 
of Europol, shows our global strength and our unwavering resolve to fight against 
terrorist content online. Daesh is no longer just losing territory on the ground – but 
also online. We will not stop until their propaganda is entirely eradicated from the 
Internet.’71 Their jubilation was short-lived; Amaq resurfaced just 6 days later to 
claim a deadly attack in Libya’s capital. A spokesperson for Europol spoke to 
reporters, saying, ‘We never claimed that we silenced them forever.’72 
 
Counter-Narratives: A Working Theory 
In the face of the seemingly Sisyphean task of deleting or blocking all terrorist 
propaganda from Islamic State and other groups online, a different solution gained 
prominence: counter-narratives. The thinking is that terrorists recruit sympathisers 
online through a communicative strategy in which their propaganda sells a ‘narrative’ 
– a blend of ideology, values, justifications, concerns and stories which are potent 
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tools for persuasion.73 One logical corollary to this radicalization trajectory is to block 
the content conveying the narrative; another is to confront it with a counter-
narrative, designed to contradict the themes and discourage support for the terrorism 
that they fuel.74 
 
Counter-narratives as a counter-terrorism policy coalesced out of the studies 
and recommendations of policymakers, think-tanks and civil society rather than 
academic literature.75 This meant, at least at first, that it lacked a fully articulated 
theory and was best conceptualized as a working theory based on a set of 
assumptions (I will return to more in-depth counter-narrative theory later in the 
paper).76 The breadth of potential counter-narrative material corralled by these civil 
society actors is illustrated by an information pack from the Online Civil Courage 
Initiative which states that ‘a counter-narrative is a tool to challenge the ideologies, 
narrative and stories of violent extremists. The purpose of a counter-narrative is to 
discredit, deconstruct and demystify extremist messages. They can do this by using 
logical or factual arguments or using satire and humour. They can be as specific or 
nuanced, as direct or indirect, as the person or group creating them wants to make 
them.’77 
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In the UK, counter-narrative theory is at least a decade old. The architect of 
CONTEST, Sir David Omand, said in 2005 that Britain ‘badly need[s] a counter-
narrative that will help groups exposed to the terrorist message make sense of what 
they are seeing around them.’78 A series of think-tanks and NGOs including the 
Quilliam Foundation and the Institute for Strategic Dialogue have helped sculpt 
government thinking and kept the need to counter Salafi-jihadist narratives at the 
forefront of policy agendas. These sentiments and rationales infused the speeches 
made by David Cameron and Theresa May referenced above, in which extremist 
‘ideology’ is blamed for the radicalization of British youth. The Home Affairs Select 
Committee report ‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping 
point’ placed great emphasis on the potential of counter-narratives, drawing on a 
study by another UK think-tank, Demos. Part of its conclusion was that the 
government ‘must forge and disseminate strong counter-narratives that will address 
the wilful blindness and blame-games of vested interests and combat the lies and 
deceit that the extremists want to feed to our young people in order to send them to 
their deaths’ (this last part is written in bold).79 As Andrew Glazzard summarises, in 
the UK ‘counter-narrative theory is firmly entrenched in government policy, political 
activism and in public debate’.80 Similar coalitions of think-tanks, civil society actors 
and government policymakers have come to parallel conclusions across the world, 
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particularly in North America and Europe, though the UK remains at the forefront of 
counter-narrative promotion.81 At an international level, the UN’s 2016 Global 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy implored member-states to develop their own counter-
narrative strategies and offered a number of sharing initiatives. In April 2017, the 
Security Council published an international framework to counter terrorist 
narratives, calling for law enforcement measures, partnerships between states and 
private internet companies, and counter-narrative campaigns facilitated by 
governments.82 
 
Do They Work? 
Due to the way that counter-narrative theory emerged as a working theory from 
a nexus of civil society practitioners and not out of academic recommendations, some 
scholars have questioned whether counter-narratives are effective at all. Andrew 
Glazzard, in his study ‘Losing the Plot’, argues that counter-narrative theory suffers 
from a crippling lack of conceptual clarity, saying ‘counter-narrative approaches to 
violent extremism are currently built on weak foundations, theoretically and 
empirically, and therefore it makes little sense for governments, multilateral bodies 
and civil society organisations to continue to invest scarce resources in such 
approaches until those foundations have been strengthened’.83 Generally, other 
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academics echo his concerns that counter-narratives are under-theorised, making 
their effectiveness difficult to gauge. But they also acknowledge that civil society 
practitioners have done a lot of work over the last few years to standardize their 
terms, establish best practices, and provide clear targets for their work.84 
 
Another criticism is that there is no empirical evidence that counter-narratives 
make a tangible impact in the way that they are spoken about. Kate Ferguson, in her 
literature review of counter-narrative theory in the UK and USA, found that there is 
‘no evidence to suggest that the current or past counter-narrative strategies have 
been effective at reducing the VE [violent extremism] threat. Moreover, publically 
available evidence, beyond isolated case studies, is at present unable to sufficiently 
demonstrate if and how counter-narratives are having a positive impact on their 
desired audiences … Despite this, much grey literature continues to presume that 
counter-narratives will be effective, even after acknowledging that they have not been 
so far.’85 
 
It is true that some grey literature is amusingly overenthusiastic about the 
impact of their counter-narrative campaigns despite thin evidence that they have 
made a positive difference. But this does not mean that counter-narrative theory is 
unverifiable, and there have been empirical tests done on the effectiveness of 
narrative and counter-narrative materials. The most complete study was done by 
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Kurt Braddock and James Price Dillard, who performed a meta-analysis on studies 
evaluating 30 years’ worth of scholarship on narratives’ persuasive influence on 
beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and behaviours; they found that ‘exposure to a narrative 
is positively related to the adoption of narrative-consistent viewpoints. It follows that 
narratives have the potential to persuade, independent of context’.86 This is closer to 
the position found in most of the better grey literature: counter-narratives have 
potential to persuade, but they need to be constructed and administered in the right 
way in order to have an impact, and the results will always be tough to measure. 
 
 
2. Counter-Narratives in Practice: the Lattice and a Problem of Scale 
The extent to which counter-narrative theory has been picked up and adopted 
by official counter-terrorist actors can be demonstrated by the proliferation of state-
linked organizations which claim to be promoting counter-narratives. 
 
The British government set up the Research Information and Communications 
Unit (RICU) within the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in 2007. According 
to observers, it uses strategic communications to counter violent extremism over a 
range of media platforms like blogs and social networking sites. Information on its 
activities is scarce, but it has been linked to a few online resources such as Educate 
Against Hate, My Former Life and Ummahsonic.87 The USA’s State Department 
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established the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) in 
2010, but their 2013 ‘Think Again Turn Away’ Twitter campaign was widely criticised 
for engaging in unedifying and counter-productive spats with ISIS supporters and 
producing content which looked decidedly amateur. It was replaced by the Global 
Engagement Center (GEC) in March 2016, which takes a more partner-orientated 
approach to content production.88 The GEC’s activities under the current Trump 
administration are unclear, especially given its newly expanded role to counter ‘the 
adverse effects of state-sponsored propaganda and disinformation’.89 Its website 
claims that the organization is ‘consulting widely’.90 
 
The European Union established the EU Internet Forum in 2015, whose primary 
aim is to liaise with Europol and the Internet Referral Unit to reduce the amount of 
terrorist content online. It is also tasked with amplifying counter-narratives through 
the Civil Social Empowerment Programme (CSEP), which runs multiple workshops 
annually covering how to create and disseminate counter-narrative campaigns.91 The 
EU set up the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in 2012, which reviews 
counter-narrative practices, organizes events and runs workshops. It is described as a 
‘network of frontline practitioners’, coordinated through the RAN Centre of 
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Excellence, and includes sub-groups such as the RAN Communications and Narratives 
division which focuses explicitly on the delivery of counter-narrative communication 
campaigns.92 
 
29 member states of the UN created the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) 
in 2011, to serve ‘as a mechanism for furthering the implementation of the 
universally-agreed UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy’, which called for national 
counter-narrative strategies. The UN also created an independent center of excellence 
in the United Arab Emirates called the Hedayah Center in December 2012. Hedayah 
hosts a counter-narrative library which is accessible to counter-violent extremism 
practitioners and academics.93 
 
According to a report for the European Parliament, a couple of NATO Centers of 
excellence exist which are charged with conducting some counter-narrative activity, 
and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OCSE) also works with 
governments, practitioners, researchers and civil society to aid community-based 
preventative measures.94 
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Outside of the West, the UAE partnered with the USA’s GEC program to create 
the Sawab Center which creates counter-narrative material designed to showcase 
ISIS’s incompetence on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube.95 Other 
organizations working in the region include Sawt Al-Hikma (‘The Voice of Reason’) 
which produces articles and short videos denouncing extremism, and Etidal in Saudi 
Arabia established in 2017.96 
 
These organizations range in transparency: they tend to have dedicated 
websites and mission statements, as well as optimistic executive summaries of their 
core activities (generally confined to action verbs such as ‘promote’, ‘amplify’, or 
‘support’, and typically they are referring to workshops). With some exceptions, such 
as Sawt Al-Hikma, these organizations do not display any substantive counter-
narrative material of their own. 
 
The Lattice 
The real bulk of counter-narrative material and practice stems from a lattice of 
think-tanks, NGOs and initiatives largely run out of London in the UK. The research 
and best practices conducted by these actors feeds into the counter-narratives they 
facilitate or construct, which in turn informs further research in an evolving feedback 
loop. Understanding this intellectual ecosystem is essential for demonstrating how 
counter-narratives are created and deployed in practice, and how this practice is 
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mismatched with many discussions of counter-narratives in grey literature and policy 
reports and also with the scale of the problem presented by ISIS propaganda. 
 
There are, of course, more organizations involved in counter-narrative theory 
and practice than the ones listed below, operating in many different countries and 
languages. But the majority of campaigns and studies are substantially informed by 
an organization from the lattice, and almost every piece of literature about counter-
narratives is linked to the lattice. Furthermore, the lattice is significantly integrated 
through professional institutional partnerships and flows of individual researchers. 
 
The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 
(ICSR), based out of the War Studies Department at King’s College, London, produces 
empirically rigorous research on the drivers of extremist groups like Islamic State.97 A 
number of prominent academics working on ISIS, Salafi-jihadism or radicalization 
more generally either currently work at ICSR or came through the War Studies 
Department, including Peter Neumann, Shiraz Maher, Charlie Winter and Aaron 
Zelin.98 Other key think-tanks working in the field include Demos, whose Centre for 
the Analysis of Social Media (CASM) examines the impact of new media forms on civil 
society and works closely with other organizations to monitor hate speech and 
extremism online; the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (formerly the Tony Blair 
Centre for Religion and Geopolitics); and the EU’s VOX-Pol Network of Excellence 
which writes reports on extremism and writes recommendations for disrupting the 
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radicalization process.99 The Quilliam Foundation used to be extremely prominent 
within the field but has been largely silent for the last couple of years after repeated 
controversies.  
 
The primary facilitator of counter-narratives within the lattice is the Institute 
for Strategic Dialogue (ISD), a ‘think-and-do tank’ which aims to ‘counter extremism 
and the ideologies that underpin it in ways that are practical, affordable, effective, and 
scalable’.100 Founded in 2006, ISD underwent a rapid period of expansion in mid-
2017 as the UK government and social media companies desperately sought new 
tools to stop the spate of ISIS attacks.101 Their programmes include intervention 
initiatives, educational resources, and activist networks, and they are partnered with 
a huge range of international organizations including Facebook, Google, Twitter, 
Microsoft, Brookings Institution, Chatham House, ICSR, Demos, the Royal United 
Services Institute (RUSI), the European Commission, and various departments from 
the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Norway, Canada, 
Sweden, the UK, and the USA.102 
 
One of the underappreciated ways in which the ISD has been central in shaping 
counter-narrative practice is through the reliance of grey literature and then 
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academic literature (reflecting the way that counter-narratives were proposed first as 
a working theory, and translated into academic literature after) on their definitions. 
Rachel Briggs and Sebastien Feve wrote a 2013 paper for ISD called ‘Review of 
Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism’ in which they distinguished 
between ‘counter-narratives’, ‘alternative narratives’ and ‘government strategic 
communications’.103 These categories were picked up by organizations such as the 
EU’s RAN (whose 2015 ‘Counter Narratives and Alternative Narratives’ paper drew 
almost exclusively on ISD definitions), the European Parliament, and various 
summarising academic papers.104 A 2016 ISD paper by Henry Tuck and Tanya 
Silverman updated this theory to note that ‘counter-narratives’ has become the 
‘catch-all term’ for these kind of strategic communications, rendering the earlier 
definition obsolete; however the tripartite distinction has continued to be used 
uncritically by certain actors (for instance the International Center for the Study of 
Violent Extremism, a think-and-do tank well outside of the lattice).105 ISD’s latest 
understanding of what constitutes a counter-narrative is commonly cited in literature 
reviews and case study reports.106 
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Moonshot CVE, founded in 2015 by two former ISD researchers, offers data-
driven solutions to violent extremism and assists counter-narrative campaigns.107 
One analyst described their approach on Twitter: ‘Can we use the same tools that 
Coca Cola uses to sell us Coke and those same tools to counter extremism? … 
Moonshot CVE is trying to do just that.’108 
 
Major Initiatives and Campaigns 
The big social media companies have established a number of initiatives and 
campaigns in response to the public and political pressure they have faced over 
misuse of their platforms by ISIS and others. These initiatives are largely run by, or at 
least in conjunction with, organizations from the lattice. 
 
Facebook has an program called ‘Peer to Peer: Facebook Global Digital 
Challenge’, or P2P, a challenge where students create anti-hate content and distribute 
it using free advertising credits: Facebook estimates that the 500 or so campaigns 
have reached around 56 million people in two years, though these campaigns do not 
necessarily have counter-violent extremism aims.109 Facebook founded the Online 
Civil Courage Initiative (OCCI) in Europe (specifically, the UK, France, and Germany) 
to ‘promote the civil courage displayed by organisations and grassroots activists 
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carrying out valuable counterspeech work online’, by supporting European NGOs, 
developing best practices, and assisting research.110 It was founded as a partnership 
between Facebook, ISD, ICSR, and the Amadeu Antonio Foundation from Germany; 
ISD currently leads the project.111 
 
Google announced in September 2017 that they were establishing a $5million 
‘fund to counter hate and extremism’ which, over two years, would ‘support 
technology-driven solutions, as well as grassroots efforts like community youth 
projects that help build communities and promote resistance to radicalization.’112 The 
only concrete monetary pledge they made was $1.3 million to ISD, which they 
described as ‘an expert counter-extremist organization in the U.K.’113 ISD 
subsequently ran two rounds of competition in which UK organizations pitched 
online projects which ‘empower and amplify new or existing voices and actions 
aiming to undermine hate and extremism; build resilience to hate and extremism 
through innovative educational resources and/or approaches; enable innovation and 
fresh thinking in approaches to tackling hate and extremism, including but not limited 
to technological innovation.’ 13 projects were awarded funding in the first round; the 
second round’s successful applicants have yet to be announced.114 
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YouTube (owned by Google) pledged in January 2018 to plough over $5million 
into its ‘Creators for Change’ program, a collective of over 100 YouTubers who 
‘encourage empathy and understanding around the world’, as part of YouTube’s 
promise to counter hate and promote tolerance on their platform.115 In the UK, 
Creators for Change teamed up with Google and ISD in 2017 to deliver workshops on 
media literacy to youths called ‘Be Internet Citizens’.116 
 
Alphabet – the parent company of Google – set up Jigsaw, an incubator which 
builds technology solutions to ‘tackle some of the toughest global security challenges 
facing the world today’.117 One of its original areas of focus was violent extremism, 
and it ran projects including the Against Violent Extremism Network, a platform for 
former violent extremists to collaborate and discourage youth from following their 
path (founded in collaboration with, and now solely run by ISD) and Abdullah-X.118 In 
2016 it created ‘The Redirect Method’, which used targeted advertising to place 
counter-narrative videos in front of people likely to be searching for ISIS propaganda 
on YouTube.119 This project was constructed in partnership with Moonshot CVE, as 
well as Quantum Communications and Valens Global.120 
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Two of the few sources of publically available counter-narrative material 
emerge from the heart of this lattice: Jigsaw’s The Redirect Method videos, and ISD’s 
counternarratives.org, which hosts resources to help build and manage counter-
narrative campaigns, including a library of case studies.121 
 
Jigsaw defined the Redirect Method project as a ‘4-step approach that employs 
readily available online resources – existing online videos and targeted advertising 
tools – to counter ISIS recruitment efforts online’.122 The Jigsaw team started by 
mapping the major recruitment narratives being used by ISIS – good governance, 
military might, religious legitimacy, a call to jihad, and the victimhood of the ummah – 
before scouring YouTube for videos which countered these themes in a credible and 
effective fashion. The team then created two new YouTube channels, one in English 
and one in Arabic, which hosted themed playlists of the handpicked videos. Using 
Google’s AdWords advertising program, these playlists were then targeted at internet 
users searching for terms indicating positive sentiments towards Islamic State, with 
the aim of enticing them into viewing the counter-narrative videos and potentially 
changing their perspective.123 An estimated 320,906 users clicked on these 116 
advertised videos during the 2-month pilot study in 2016, which were watched for a 
combined total of 500,070 minutes.124 
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ISD ran a similar study to the Redirect Method earlier in October 2015 in which 
they provided funding and guidance to three counter-narrative video campaigns and 
assessed the impact.125 The campaigns were Average Mohamed, which they described 
as ‘a non-profit organisation that uses animation to encourage critical thinking among 
Somali youth (in Somali and English) about extremist ideologies’, ExitUSA, ‘a project 
of a US-based non-profit organisation ‘Life After Hate’ which aims to discourage 
individuals from joining white power movements and encourage defection by 
offering a way out’, and Harakut-ut-Taleem, ‘a front organisation … they aim to 
counter Taliban recruitment narratives in Pakistan.’126 The Average Mohamed 
campaign consisted of five specially produced videos called ‘Be Like Aisha’, ‘A Muslim 
In The West’, ‘Identity In Islam’, ‘Islam Against Slavery’, and ‘The Bullet Or The Ballot’, 
which tackled themes of identity, gender equality, democracy, belonging, and 
slavery.127 ISD paid for advertising across Facebook, Twitter and YouTube which 
targeted the campaigns at the relevant demographics: for Average Mohamed, 14-25 
year olds in the UK and USA who were searching social media for terms and figures 
deemed sympathetic to Islamic State.128 The three campaigns overall received over 
378,000 video views and over 20,000 ‘total engagements’ (including likes, shares, 
replied, retweets and comments). They generated over 480 comments, and all three 
of the campaigns’ social media accounts increased in likes. ISD published the 
engagement data in full with a set of recommendations for further campaigns, 
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drawing particular attention to the far reach of social media advertising for 
comparatively low costs.129 
 
Average Mohamed and ExitUSA are listed on ISD’s counternarratives.org, which 
invites viewers to ‘learn more and get inspiration from successful counter-narrative 
campaigns run by organisations around the world.’130 19 campaigns are presented, of 
which 15 are aimed at ‘Islamist extremism’ (ISD also works to combat far-right 
extremism). They are drawn from organizations based in at least 6 countries, working 
in 4 languages, and include projects like Abdullah-X, Extreme Dialogue (a Canadian-
funded series of videos telling personal stories of people affected by extremism), and 
Not Another Brother (a Quilliam Foundation dramatic video about British man who 
has travelled to join ISIS). However, a number of the initiatives listed have been silent 
for many years.131 
 
I want to offer some critical observations about counter-narratives in practice. 
As noted, they largely emerge from the lattice in London, and this is certainly where 
the social media giants reach when they need assistance creating initiatives as a 
response to public and political pressure. I contend that there is a large disconnect 
between the way counter-narratives are spoken about in policy papers or political 
circles and the actual quantitative scale that they are operating on which needs to be 
recognized. 
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The Narrow Set of Counter-Narrative ‘Examples’ 
Speaking in front of the General Assembly in 2015, the United Nations Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon had this to say as part of his plan of action to prevent violent 
extremism: ‘The manipulative messages of violent extremists on social media have 
achieved considerable success in luring people, especially young women and men, 
into their ranks. While violent extremists have demonstrated some sophistication in 
their use of old and new media tools, it is equally true that we who reject their 
message have largely failed to communicate to those who are disillusioned and 
disenfranchised a vision of the future that captures their imagination and offers the 
prospect of tangible change. Thousands of young activists and artists are fighting back 
against violent extremism online through music, art, film, comics and humour, and they 
deserve our support.’132 
 
This may well be the case. But where are they? The political will certainly exists 
to amplify and project the voices of such counter-narrative actors; in fact, the same 
speech called on member states to ‘develop and implement national communications 
strategies, in close cooperation with social media companies and the private sector 
[and] promote grass-roots efforts to advance the values of tolerance, pluralism and 
understanding’.133 Yet literature reviews and scholarly articles repeatedly refer back 
to the same campaigns and material as singular ‘examples’ of counter-narrative 
content. The implication is often that plenty of other material exists, yet this does not 
seem to be true. 
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Take, for instance, a RAN issue paper from 2015. Its ‘examples of counter- and 
alternative narratives’ annexe features Abdullah-X, One2One, Extreme Dialogue and 
EXIT Germany, all of which are campaigns run by or in partnership with ISD.134 It was 
particularly impressed with Abdullah-X, noting its ‘concise but compelling content 
[and] engaging visual style’.135 ISD’s own ‘Counter-Narrative Monitoring & Evaluation 
Handbook’ from 2016 cites only Average Mohamed, Extreme Dialogue, and ExitUSA 
in its ‘Evaluation Case Studies’ section.136 An extremely thorough report by the 
European Parliament in 2017 includes a section on ‘Actions Taken and Projects Set 
Up on a European Level’, in which the only civil society organizations mentioned are 
ISD, the Quilliam Foundation, and Moonshot CVE.137  The next section in the same 
report is titled ‘Present Approaches from a Selection of EU Member States and Third 
Countries’, which talks about the Redirect Method, ISD, Hedayah, and RAN. Only one 
series of actual counter-narrative content is named: Abdullah-X.138 A comprehensive 
literature review for the EU’s VOX-Pol Network of Excellence in 2017 by two ICSR 
researchers discusses Saudi Arabia’s al-Sakinah project (which has been silent since 
2013), the Redirect Method, and Abdullah-X.139 Finally, the UK Home Affairs Select 
Committee’s paper ‘Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping 
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point’ recommends that the government hold regular meetings with British Muslims 
and counter-narrative think-tanks, into order to build a ‘bank of best-practice 
counter-narrative case studies’ and help ‘implement effective counter-narrative 
programmes’. These recommendations were based on ‘[t]he success of Abdullah-X’s 
YouTube channel’.140 
 
The point is that the same campaigns and organizations are repeatedly recycled 
as examples of counter-narrative campaigns. This pushes back against policy 
proclamations which imply that there are thousands of counter-narratives either 
already extant, or just waiting for the right amplifying mechanism. This same dynamic 
was obvious on 17th January 2017, when Facebook, YouTube and Twitter were 
hauled in front of the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 
to explain their oft-cited inaction in the face of extremist misuse of their platforms in 
a hearing called ‘Terrorism and Social Media: Is Big Tech Doing Enough?’.141 Each of 
the companies had plenty to say about their content detection and deletion strategies, 
but relied on the same few examples when talking about their soft approaches. 
Monika Bickert from Facebook noted that they had ‘partnered with non-
governmental organizations and community groups around the world’, for instance 
setting up the OCCI with ISD, organizing hackathons with Affinis Labs, and developing 
the Facebook Global Digital Challenge (P2P). Juniper Downs from YouTube argued 
that they had expanded their expertise by reaching out to ‘several counter-terrorism 
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experts such as the Institute of Strategic Dialogue and International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalization’, and had invested in both Creators for Change and had 
deployed the Redirect Method. Carlos Monje Jr. from Twitter noted their 
collaboration with Parle-moi d’Islam (France), Active Change Foundation (UK), Wahid 
Foundation (Indonesia), the Sawab Center (UAE) and True Islam (USA), and argued 
that ‘[w]e supported the Institute for Strategic Dialogue’s ‘Against Violent Extremism’, 
the results of which were published in a report’; he was referring to the ISD’s 2015-16 
study of Average Mohamed, ExitUSA, and Hakut-ut-Taleem, explained above. 
 
Only a couple of sources allude to existing counter-narrative material from 
outside the lattice. A 2017 how-to guide from Hedayah lists 5 organizations operating 
in the Middle East and North Africa region: al-Sakinah, Sawt al-Hikma, the Sawab 
Center, al-Rabita al-Muhammedyya of Muslim Scholars, and Eitdal (of which all except 
al-Sakinah appear to be currently active), and a March 2018 paper from ICSR 
examines counter-narrative organizations and efforts in the UK, France and Germany; 
ISIS-focused campaigns from the continent include Ufuq.de, Datteltäter, Stop-
Djihadisme, the Association française des Victimes du Terrorisme, and Katiba des 
Narvalos.142 Hedayah’s counter-narrative library currently features 784 examples in 
17 languages (over half of it in English), but of this only 40 examples are listed as 
‘social media campaign’s, and 50 examples are ‘social media pages’. Even these 
figures are slightly misleading, given that many of the campaigns and pages featured 
are Twitter hashtags which were briefly trending in specific contexts, and some of the 
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pages are posted multiple times. This expands the range of counter-narrative material 
which we can positively assert exists, but still leaves the global state of play well short 
of Ban Ki-Moon’s assertion that ‘thousands’ of young activists are involved. 
 
Blurred Lines between Pilots and Strategies 
The accounts given by the social media giants at the US Senate Committee 
hearing ‘Terrorism and Social Media: Is Big Tech Doing Enough?’ illustrate another 
quantitative problem with counter-narratives in practice: as companies scramble to 
respond to political and public pressure, pilot campaigns designed to explore the 
potential for counter-narrative messaging online have been repackaged and 
presented as long-running counter-terrorism strategies.143 These misrepresentations 
have been picked up by the media and misinform common understandings about the 
scale on which counter-narratives are operating. 
 
The 2015-16 ISD study using Average Mohamed, ExitUSA, and Hakut-ut-Taleem, 
was intended to test the hypothesis that ‘a small amount of funding and guidance for 
counter-narrative campaigners, in terms of deploying social media advertising tools 
to reach ‘target audiences’, could dramatically improve the awareness, engagement 
and impact of counter-narratives and NGOs working in this space’.144 They 
furthermore wanted to construct an evaluative framework for online counter-
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narratives, to help inform other efforts. The paper concludes that ‘this methodology – 
an organised cycle of curation, production, data acquisition and analysis – can be 
replicated and applied globally’.145 
 
As demonstrated above, there is minimal evidence that this model has been 
‘applied globally’ in any meaningful sense. The study itself concluded in 2016. 
However Twitter seized the results of this report to prove its participation in 
meaningful counter-terrorism strategies, stating, ‘we supported the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue’s ‘Against Violent Extremism’ project … The project used pro bono 
Twitter advertising to increase the reach of key NGOs. The campaigns yielded real 
results. One NGO participant, Average Mohamed, doubled its number of Twitter 
followers and another, ExitUSA, tripled its Twitter followers.’146 ISD’s short 
exploratory study became framed as a sustained strategy by a social media platform 
which gifted it some advertising credits over two years previously. 
 
The Redirect Method is an even clearer example of this. The original report – 
subtitled ‘a Blueprint for Bypassing Extremism’ – is extremely clear that the study 
conducted in 2016 is a pilot experiment.147 It ends with a section titled ‘Follow the 
Blueprint’, featuring a 44-step guide to creating, disseminating and evaluating 
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analogous campaigns, which it asks be shared on a third-party website. So far, there 
have been no engagements or parallel campaigns posted.148 
 
YouTube’s testimony in front of the US Senate Committee presented the 
Redirect Method by saying ‘Google’s Jigsaw group, an incubator to tackle some of the 
toughest global security challenges, has deployed the Redirect Method, which uses 
Adwords targeting tools and curated YouTube videos uploaded to disrupt online 
radicalization. It focuses on the slice of ISIS’s audience that is most susceptible to its 
messaging and redirects them towards YouTube playlists of videos debunking ISIS 
recruitment themes.’149 The deliberately atemporal language casts the Redirect 
Method as an ongoing strategy as opposed to an 8-week pilot study conducted in 
2016. 
 
This understanding of the Redirect Method has pervaded media representations 
of the study. Articles with titles like ‘Google’s Clever Plan to Stop Aspiring ISIS 
Recruits’, ‘The subtle way Google plans to use its greatest skill to combat ISIS’, and 
‘Jigsaw’s Redirect Method: Brainwashing the Brainwashed’ from 2016 are littered 
across the internet.150 In July 2017, YouTube did announce plans stating they ‘hope’ 
to roll out the Redirect Method across its platform on a permanent basis; and in 
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August they claimed they had ‘started rolling out features’ (in both cases, it is unclear 
whether they mean in general, or just in Europe).151 There has been no update since, 
and my attempts to trip the redirection algorithm using the ‘suspicious’ phrases listed 
in the Redirect Method study in both the UK and USA have delivered a mix of search 
results including both pro- and anti-ISIS videos. 
 
Translating Commitments into Practice 
The current prevailing model for commissioning and deploying counter-
narratives is for funding to flow from governments or wealthy companies such as 
social media giants, through NGOs, to grassroots organizations or content creators. In 
this model, the primary facilitators of the counter-narratives are NGOs: they are 
responsible for sourcing and disseminating counter-narrative content. 
 
This was not always the case. The UK government directly ran a number of 
counter-narrative campaigns in the period between the 7/7 bombings and the rise of 
ISIS. The Home Office’s Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) 
developed counter-radicalisation messaging campaigns (as they were then called), 
and the UK government bolstered select initiatives like the Radical Middle Way. They 
also established a £70million Prevent Extremist Pathfinder Fund in October 2006 
which supported local authorities in developing their own programs for dealing with 
violent extremism.152 All of these initiatives were criticized for being ineffective and 
controversial; they were seen as isolating Muslim communities and exacerbating 
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concerns that the government was targeting British Muslims with the CONTEST 
counter-terrorism strategy. In short – as the 2016 Home Affairs Select Committee 
noted – the concern was that the campaigns were too closely affiliated with the 
government. The Committee cited witnesses (including the Quilliam Foundation and 
ISD) who agreed ‘that it was better for the source of the counter-narrative to be 
community-led and non-government.’153 
 
In the new model, civil society and local practitioners are empowered to take 
the lead in counter-narrative production. This model has many proponents and many 
obvious attractions: at-risk communities are more likely to trust the content producer 
if they are from that community, secular governments can nominally distance 
themselves from accusations of establishing ‘official’ religious positions, and the set-
up and running costs are low.154 
 
But a persistent problem with such decentralized messaging structures is that 
the funding pledges from the ‘top’ (the government or social media giants) rarely 
translate into the kind of substantive counter-narrative material at the ‘bottom’ as 
they envision or promise. Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger note that after 9/11, ‘vast 
pools of money became available for CVE [counter-violent extremism], which resulted 
in many people repurposing their pet projects under that heading … town halls and 
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soccer leagues, as the joke in the practitioner community goes.’155 Something similar 
appears to be happening in the current counter-narrative lattice, resulting in a glut of 
proclaimed of counter-narrative projects with very little published information about 
their effects or even tangible products to show for all their funding and workshops.156 
 
Let’s take some examples. In David Cameron’s 2015 speech about the dangers of 
Islamist extremism, he said, ‘We can’t stand neutral in this battle of ideas. We have to 
back those who share our values. So here’s my offer. If you’re interested in reform; if 
you want to challenge the extremists in our midst; if you want to build an alternative 
narrative or if you just want to help your kids – we are with you and we will back you 
– with practical help, with funding, with campaigns, with protection and with political 
representation.’157 It is entirely unclear whether any of these rather amorphous 
claims were ever actioned, and if so in what way. 
 
A more concrete pledge came from the EU Internet Forum’s Civil Society 
Empowerment Programme (CSEP), ‘a new EU initiative supported by the RAN Centre 
of Excellence (RAN CoE) to encourage online campaigns countering extremist 
propaganda’ in October 2017.158 It noted that the EU had allocated €6million to 
support counter-narrative campaigns, and that interested organizations and 
producers could submit campaign proposals until January 2018 for €250,000 to 
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€1million in funding. Their campaigns should ‘target groups within the EU who are 
susceptible and vulnerable to online radicalisation and terrorist content, or those 
who have either been radicalised or are on the brink of radicalisation. Proposed 
campaigns should provide these target groups with credible alternatives and positive 
narratives, or challenge and expose terrorist and extremist online propaganda’.159 
The call for proposals was resent in December 2017, and broadcast across the RAN 
website and Twitter. There has been radio silence since: no successful counter-
narrative campaigns have been announced, and RAN CSEP has not responded to my 
requests for information. It is entirely possible that the campaigns are being 
strategically deployed in a way that prohibits their public advertisement, but it seems 
unlikely. RAN CSEP uploaded 5 updates on their activities for 2017, but they have not 
published anything in 2018.160 
 
The $5million ‘innovation fund’ announced by Google to ‘counter hate and 
extremism’ has at least resulted in the funding of actual initiatives. As noted, only 
$1.3million of it has been allocated to an NGO as of yet, to ISD in London, which has 
finalized 1 of 2 application rounds.161 The 13 projects which were successfully 
granted funding are wide-ranging: they include HOPE not hate’s ‘Project 
Counterbalance’, a tool for identifying hateful content on social media and responding 
with counter-narrative content, Paddington Arts’s ‘Faith, Identity and Belonging’, 
where young people create artwork based on discussions with former extremists, and 
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Limehouse Boxing Academy’s ‘KO Racism’, boxing lessons which include a discussion 
about racism and prejudice.162 The original Google pledge was to support 
‘technology-driven solutions, as well as grassroots efforts like community youth 
projects that help build communities and promote resistance to radicalization’; this is 
what it looks like in practice.163 
 
The point here is not to denigrate the (presumably excellent) work being done 
by these small NGOs and grassroots organizations in the UK being funded by Google 
through the ISD. But it is important to note that internationally-recognized gestures 
by regional organizations like the EU’s RAN or social media giants like Google have to 
translate into substantive content on the ground. Often, this material never 
materializes – it simply gets lost somewhere in the multiple levels and machinations 
of transnational promises and funding flows – and when it does, it takes very specific, 
localized forms: Google’s promise of a massive cash injection designed to counter ISIS 
and other extremists, extracted under immense political and public pressure in the 
UK, Europe, and the USA, has resulted in some boxing lessons being funded in East 
London. 
 
A New Context: Information Warfare 
Let’s put this in a different context. In 2017, the primary antisocial user of social 
media that policy-makers and the public were concerned about in the West was ISIS. 
In 2018, this shifted very rapidly to Russia. In the US Senate Committee hearing with 
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the social media giants, the company representatives focused on their counter-
terrorism policies and campaigns; however, Senator Bill Wilson and Clint Watts from 
the Foreign Policy Institute both placed ISIS online propaganda in the context of the 
state-sponsored disinformation spread by Russia.164 
 
According to Robert Mueller’s February 2018 Indictment of 13 Russian 
nationals charged with interfering in the USA’s 2016 Presidential elections, the 
Russian state established an organization called the Internet Research Agency which 
employed hundreds of people for ‘online operations’, including meddling with the US 
electorate.165 The Internet Research Agency had a budget of millions of dollars which 
financed its graphics, data analysis, search-engine optimization, information-
technology and finance departments. Project Lakhta – a multi-campaign project 
which included the manipulation of US voters – had a monthly budget of around $1.25 
million by September 2017. The Internet Research Agency had a running program 
focused on the US population from April 2014, conducting operations on YouTube, 
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter which created fake social media accounts and 
divisive group pages designed to sow discord. The impact of these pages and profiles 
was measured through various engagement metrics and constant reports.166 
According to Mark Zuckerberg’s testimony in front of Congress, Facebook found 
evidence that the Internet Research Agency manipulated electorates across the USA, 
                                                          
164 ‘Terrorism and Social Media: Is Big Tech Doing Enough?’, U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation, 17th January 2018. 
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/1/terrorism-and-social-media-
isbigtechdoingenough. Accessed on 22nd May 2018. 
165 Priscilla Alvarez & Taylor Hosking, ‘The Full Text of Mueller’s Indictment of 13 Russians’, The 
Atlantic, 16th February 2018. 
166 Ibid. 
54 
 
Europe and Russia, using at least 470 accounts and generating around 80,000 posts 
over two years, reaching approximately 126million people.167 
 
Reading Mueller’s indictment, it is striking that the Internet Research Agency’s 
operations read like a textbook counter-narrative campaign from the ‘how-to’ guides 
produced by ISD, the Redirect Method, Hedayah, and other organizations in the 
lattice.168 These guides (broadly) feature step-by-step directions for understanding 
the campaign’s objectives, identifying the target audience, determining an effective 
messenger, identifying cheap and scalable mediums, developing effective content, 
disseminating it in a sustained manner, and evaluating the impact – everything that 
Russia did with such devastating results, except on a scale which utterly outstrips any 
of the counter-narrative campaigns deployed against Islamic State. 
 
I agree with a 2015 RAN paper which says ‘[t]he success of counter messaging 
overall depends on it being of a scale and quality that is proportional to the challenge 
we face: equal to the ISIL propaganda machine in terms of volume, production value, 
and speed. At present, combined counter-narrative and alternative narrative efforts 
represent a drop in the ocean compared to ISIL.’169 Or, in Peter Neumann from ICSR’s 
words (in front of Congress), ‘Even if we found the perfect messenger, and even if we 
managed to produce the perfect video, it would still be a drop in the ocean. There still 
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wouldn’t be oomph. This is the internet. People are exposed to thousands of things 
every day. You need to be loud, you need volume, and you can’t be on your own.’170 
 
Islamic State, at one point in 2014, had approximately 46,000 overt supporters 
on Twitter alone retweeting and disseminating thousands of pieces of content, aided 
by bots carefully calibrated to avoid triggering Twitter’s anti-spam protocols.171 
These supporters circulated thousands of individual content points through a fluid 
and dispersed network of accounts conceptualized by Ali Fisher as a ‘swarmcast’, 
ensuring the persistent presence of jihadist content online.172 ISIS built a brand, with 
recognizable iconography – the black flag, the stark color scheme, the high-quality 
videos – and tightly woven narratives. 
 
In contrast, the counter-narrative campaigns run out of the lattice are launched 
from a handful of social media accounts, and they are few and far between. The 
quality of the content notwithstanding, they do not operate on any kind of scale 
comparable to the phenomenon they aim to confront.173 A standing criticism of 
counter-narratives in literature reviews and scholarly studies is that there remains a 
very large gap between the volume of counter-narrative campaigns and the 
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propaganda operations of Islamic State.174 But it is difficult to see how this can be 
rectified without ploughing in levels of resources and operatives equivalent to the 
Russian Internet Research Agency – which of course would embroil counter-narrative 
producers in all sorts of moral and legal quandaries which they are currently largely 
able to avoid. 
 
Perhaps the most visceral example of the disjunction between the scales on 
which Islamic State propaganda operates – or at least used to operate – and that of 
the counter-narratives comes, again, from the US Senate Committee hearing with 
Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. In the statement from Twitter by Carlos Monje Jr., he 
notes that Twitter supported the ISD campaign in which Average Mohamed ‘doubled 
its number of Twitter followers’ and ExitUSA ‘tripled its Twitter followers’.175 
However he neglected to mention the actual number of followers on these Twitter 
accounts: ExitUSA tripled its Twitter followers from 50 to 155; Average Mohamed 
doubled from 90 to 183.176 Twitter has around 336 million users monthly. 
 
A Problem of Scale: Conclusions 
There is, of course, more to this problem than simply scale. Monika Bickert and 
Brian Fishman quote the Irish Republican Army in one of their ‘Hard Questions’ blog 
posts, after the IRA failed to assassinate British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 
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1984: ‘Today we were unlucky, but remember that we only have to be lucky once – 
you will have to be lucky always.’177 The purpose of the Russian election meddling, as 
far as we know, was to incite uncertainty and discord, and ultimately shift the 
allegiances of a small fraction of the electorate enough to influence the election 
outcome. It was wholly a big-numbers game. 
 
The online battle against Islamic State is also a big-numbers game, but it is 
intensely personal at the same time: only one person needs to slip through the net to 
launch a terror attack in their home country, with potentially devastating effects and 
largescale loss of life. 
 
This is why research from ICSR, VOX-Pol, ISD and others emphasise that 
counter-narrative online campaigns can only ever be part of the answer; personal 
interventions (like ISD’s One2One programme) and offline interventions are also 
necessary. Perhaps most importantly, the social media companies need to keep up 
their sustained assault on Islamic State propaganda on their platforms, detecting and 
deleting it in bulk. 
 
The point remains that counter-narratives have attracted attention in CVE 
circles which is disproportionate to the quantity of campaigns which actually exist, 
and that counter-narratives at the moment are not operating on any kind of 
comparative scale to the threat which they confront.  
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3. The Role of Religion in Counter-Narratives 
The quantity of counter-narratives notwithstanding, publically accessible 
counter-narratives from ISD and the Redirect Method can be analysed to demonstrate 
the role that religion ought to play in dismantling Islamic State narratives. This 
chapter uses counter-narrative academic theory, qualitative insights about the nature 
of Islamic State propaganda disseminated online, and best-practice counter-narrative 
examples to argue that successful counter-narratives necessarily operate out of the 
same religious framework as ISIS content, therefore leveraging the same powerful 
normative religious appeals whilst discouraging violent acts of terror. 
 
Religion in Counter-Narrative Theory 
Kurt Braddock and his co-authors have done extensive work to infuse counter-
narrative working theory with thoroughly researched academic communications 
strategies in a series of papers from 2012 to 2018.178 Braddock and John Horgan, in 
‘Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce 
Support for Terrorism’ (2016) define a terrorist ‘ideology’ as ‘a group of beliefs to 
which a terrorist group purport to adhere and attempts to instil in members to guide 
their actions’; a ‘narrative’ is ‘a vehicle through which an ideology can be 
communicated’.179 They offer constructive methods for ‘fighting fire with fire by using 
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the narrative form (i.e. the vehicle) to counter ideologies that terrorist groups 
disseminate via their own strategies’.180 The medium for this is ‘counternarratives’: 
‘narratives comprised of content that challenges the main themes intrinsic to other 
narratives … counternarratives challenge themes within terrorist narratives that are 
consistent with the group’s ideology’.181 
 
According to Braddock and Horgan, there are three steps to creating effective 
counter-narratives: 1) analysing the terrorists’ narratives; 2) constructing counter-
narratives that challenge terrorist narratives; and 3) disseminating the counter-
narratives in a manner which overcomes barriers of persuasion.182 
 
The first step involves thorough and careful scrutiny of the propaganda being 
produced by the terrorist organization. Braddock and Horgan recommend combing 
through the content multiple times, before establishing an evaluative code, breaking 
the data set into different thematic categories, and quantifying the results.183 
 
The next step is to construct counternarratives which challenge the terrorist 
narratives which have been identified. Braddock and Horgan argue that practitioners 
should: 1) avoid reinforcing themes emphasized within the terrorist narratives (for 
instance by strenuously denying claims, placing the terrorist group in charge of the 
discourse); 2) reveal inconsistencies and contradictions in the terrorist narratives 
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and their actions; 3) disconnect terrorist narratives from real-world events; 4) 
contest binary ideological presentations of the world; and 5) present an alternative 
view of the terrorists narrative’s target.184  These recommendations are concordant 
with ones made by J.M. Berger in his 2017 ‘linkage-based’ approach to disrupting 
Islamic State propaganda, in which he argues that ISIS propaganda creates ‘links’ 
between itself (the ‘in-group’) and its targeted recruits, which it then presents as 
opposed to outside people and the outside world (the ‘out-group’).185 Their intention 
is to draw sympathisers into a binary worldview in which there is just ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
resulting in the simplification of life and thought in which good and evil are brought 
out in stark contrast.186 This worldview can be contested by counter-narratives which 
seek to build links between the would-be sympathisers and the out-group, or dissolve 
links between the potential recruits and the Islamic State.187 
 
The third step is finding an appropriate dissemination strategy which spreads 
the content without engendering mistrust or suspicion.188 As Braddock and John 
Morrison show in a recent paper, cultivating trust between counter-narrative 
disseminators and the targeted audience is absolutely essential for the transmission 
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of the message.189 Failure to establish trust risks antagonizing the target and 
worsening the situation.190 
 
Broadly speaking, the how-to guides from NGOs within the lattice offer similar 
instructions for constructing counter-narrative content, although their literature is 
stuffed with more practical advice (and typically feature a fourth evaluative step). The 
ISD’s Counter-Narrative Handbook (2016), the Redirect Method blueprint (2016) and 
Hedayah’s how-to guide for counter-narratives in the Middle East and North Africa 
(2017) all call on practitioners to identify the narratives they want to counter, 
construct content with a carefully calibrated message, and disseminate it as widely as 
possible in such a way that the target audience are receptive.191 
 
Prominent campaigns from within the lattice broadly follow a variant of the 
rigorous communications-based strategy laid out by Braddock and Horgan, and 
therefore create subtle and well-thought-out campaigns which respond to ISIS 
narratives without reinforcing ideological binaries or losing the trust of the 
prospective audience. In contrast, poorly conceived counter-narrative campaigns 
reinforce insider-outsider dynamics and are presented from a position of ideological 
superiority which fails to connect with target audiences, antagonizing more than they 
engage. 
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The Religious Content of Islamic State Propaganda 
There have been multiple large-scale analyses of Islamic State’s propaganda 
output over the last few years. Typically, the research procedure follows the methods 
outlined by Braddock and Horgan above: a researcher (or team of researchers) 
collects a data-set of ISIS propaganda from social media (normally Twitter), spends a 
while acquainting themselves with it, before categorizing it according to its main 
themes and presenting the results. As every researcher chooses their own system of 
categorization, there is no real way to measure the results against one another with 
any kind of systematic rigour. 
 
Aaron Zelin, a Fellow of ICSR, examined a week of official ISIS media releases 
from 18th – 24th April 2015 which he analysed in a report called ‘Picture Or It Didn’t 
Happen: A Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official Media Output’.192 Looking at the 123 
pieces of content disseminated on Twitter from 3 official ISIS accounts that week, he 
argued that ISIS’s content was far broader than the gruesome execution videos which 
were receiving significant media attention.193 He categorized the content according to 
the following schema: Military, Governance, Dawah [proselytising], Hisbah 
[accountability], Promotion of the Caliphate, Enemy Attacks, News, Martyrdom, 
Execution, Denying Enemy Reports, and Other. According to this categorization, the 
bulk of Islamic State’s content was military in nature.194 
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Charlie Winter, also from ICSR, gathered two larger sets of data nearly two years 
apart. From 17th July 2015 to 15th August 2015 he collated Islamic State propaganda 
using officially-designated hashtags, gathering 892 products from 38 outlets.195 He 
divided this data into the following categories: Brutality, Mercy, Belonging, 
Victimhood, War, and Utopia, with the last two categories each containing several 
sub-categories.196 A second data set was collected from 31st December 2016 to 29th 
January 2017 using feeds on Telegram and Twitter, resulting in 463 pieces of content 
(significantly less than 2015). These propaganda materials were divided into 3 
thematic groups – Victimhood, Utopia, and Warfare – and contrasted with the 2015 
data (which had been re-codified according to this new tripartite division) to show 
that in the 18 months between the two studies, ISIS had shifted the main focus of 
their narratives from Utopia to Warfare.197 
 
Daniel Milton produced a similar report in 2016, in which he examined over 
9,000 Twitter content pieces marked with an official Islamic State logo from January 
2015 to August 2016.198 He examined each release and coded it according to its 
primary theme, leading to the conclusion that 48% of Islamic State propaganda from 
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the period was primarily Military in nature; 20% concerned with Governance, 19% 
Other, 7% Commercial, 7% Religious, and under 0.5% Lifestyle-based.199 
 
However, Milton noted a problem: ‘Focusing on the primary theme of a release 
is not without limitations. One of these is that, on some level, all of the Islamic State’s 
products have religious undertones. A product that focuses on traditional military 
activities (soldiers fighting enemies, the aftermath of the battles, etc.) still has a 
religious meaning for the group as it fights to establish the caliphate and hasten an 
apocalyptic confrontation with its enemies. The same could be said for a product 
showing a construction crew paving a street. Are they paving a street or building 
(literally) a religious state?’200 Milton and others notice the problem that it is 
impossible to isolate the religious elements of the narratives from the irreligious, 
because such a clear divide does not exist. Identifying what proportion of Islamic 
State’s propaganda is ‘religious’ – in the sense that it focuses on mosques, sermons, or 
dawah (to use Milton’s criteria) – is less important than noting that the linguistic, 
visual, and cultural frameworks deployed by Islamic State to frame all of their 
propaganda pieces are religious. 
 
Graeme Wood makes a similar point in his phenomenally successful article for 
the Atlantic, ‘What ISIS Really Wants’ (2015). He quotes Bernard Haykel, writing 
‘according to Haykel, the ranks of the Islamic State are deeply infused with religious 
vigor. Koranic quotations are ubiquitous. “Even the foot soldiers spout this stuff 
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constantly,” Haykel says. “They mug for their cameras and repeat their basic 
doctrines in formulaic fashion, and they do it all the time.”201  
 
This is immediately obvious when examining Islamic State content. For instance, 
in a report proclaiming the establishment of the caliphate in June 2014, ISIS 
spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani writes ‘Here the flag of the Islamic State, the 
flag of tawhid [monotheism], rises and flutters. Its shade covers land from Aleppo to 
Diyala. Beneath it, the walls of the tawaghit [tyrants] have been demolished, their 
flags have fallen, and their borders have been destroyed. Their soldiers are either 
killed, imprisoned, or defeated. The Muslims are honored. The kuffar [infidels] are 
disgraced.’202 Another example is the comment referenced earlier from an Islamic 
State media operative manual translated by Charlie Winter: ‘Anyone who knows the 
Crusaders of today and keeps track of that which infuriates them understands how 
they are angered and terrorised by jihadi media. They – the curse of Allah the 
Almighty be on them – know its importance, impact and significance more than any 
others!’203 This short passage is about strategic communications and would probably 
be coded as ‘Warfare’ in one of the analyses above. Nonetheless, it is written in a 
profoundly religious lexicon, and pulls on the political-cultural history of Islam in its 
representation of a battle of Tweets. 
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Lorne Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam (Senior Research Fellow at ISD) 
conducted 25 interviews from mid-2014 with foreign fighters who had travelled to 
Islamic State territory and 40 interviews with friends and family of other foreign 
fighters.204 They published a results paper which pushed against theories 
emphasizing the purely socioeconomic factors which cause people to travel to fight 
for ISIS, arguing ‘most of the fighters involved provided justifications for being a 
foreign fighter that were largely moral and religious in character, more than explicitly 
political, although there is little real separation between these things in the minds of 
these individuals.’205 They went on, ‘the interactions with these individuals were so 
heavily mediated by religious discourse it seems implausible to suggest that 
religiosity (i.e. a sincere religious commitment, no matter how ill-informed or 
unorthodox) is not a primary motivator for their actions. Religion provides the 
dominant frame these foreign fighters use to interpret almost every aspect of their 
lives.’206 Similarly, online propaganda from Islamic state is saturated with religious 
content and framed in religious terms, which does not detract from its profoundly 
political message. 
 
The Salafi-Jihadi Vision 
This content provides an ideological vision in which Islam is incompatible with 
modern life and can only be realised by supporting Islamic State. It pushes an 
absolute bifurcation between normative Islam and everything and everyone else. Al-
                                                          
204 Lorne Dawson & Amarnath Amarasingam, ‘Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the 
Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq’, 2016. 
205 Ibid; emphasis added. 
206 Ibid. 
67 
 
Adnani, when announcing the establishment of the caliphate, writes, ‘So rush O 
Muslims and gather around your khalifah [caliph], so that you may return as you once 
were for ages, kings of the earth and knights of war. ... By Allah, if you disbelieve in 
democracy, secularism, nationalism, as well as all the other garbage and ideas from 
the west, and rush to your religion and creed, then by Allah, you will own the earth, 
and the east and west will submit to you. This is the promise of Allah to you. This is 
the promise of Allah to you.’207 Just as ISIS seeks to tear foreign fighters from their 
communities and families, so it seeks to tear Islam from the societies in which 
Muslims live. 
 
There is a scene in the wildly popular Islamic State video ‘Clanging of the 
Swords, Part 4’, in which an IS fighter stands with his Kosovan passport in one hand 
and a microphone in the other, surrounded by fellow fighters foisting black IS flags, 
also clutching their passports. The man shouts: 
 
‘We say to the tawaghit [tyrants] and the disbelievers everywhere, we 
say to you as Ibrahim – peace and blessings be upon him – said to his father, 
‘Verily, we are free from you and whatever you worship besides Allah. We 
have rejected you, and there has started between us and you hostility and 
hatred forever until you believe in Allah alone.’ And we say to you as the 
Prophet Muhammad – peace and blessings be upon him – said, ‘We have come 
to you with nothing but slaughter.’ So rejoice, oh disbelievers. Declare Allah 
the Greatest! Allah is the Greatest!’ … These are your passports, oh tawaghit in 
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every place. For I swear by Allah that we are Muslims. We are Muslims. We are 
Muslims. Declare Allah the Greatest! Allah is the Greatest!’208 
 
During the scene he draws a large knife, as the crowd gets more and more 
raucous. At the end, he brandishes his passport at the camera and then rips it apart, 
throwing it on the ground before stabbing it with the knife as his fellow fighters 
throw down their own shredded passports alongside his. The point is clear: there is 
an absolute distinction between the Islamic State fighters and the tawaghit, between 
the Muslims and the disbelievers, and between the caliphate and the nations the 
fighters have come from. It is fundamentally impossible to belong to another nation 
as a Muslim, the video argues, and so these angry young men visibly shred the most 
obvious marker of their original nationalities whilst they shout ‘we are Muslims’. 
 
According to Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ‘What seems to be most appealing 
about violent fundamentalist groups – whatever combination of reasons an individual 
may cite for joining – is the simplification of life and thought. Good and evil are 
brought out in stark relief. Life is transformed through action.’209 Mark 
Juergensmeyer draws on interviews with terrorists from around the world to argue 
in Terror in the Mind of God that religious terrorism escalates the stakes of the conflict 
in the minds of the fighters beyond any temporal scale; they understand themselves 
as participating in a ‘cosmic war’.210 He notes that the religious worldview 
underpinning such fanaticism is appealing, providing otherwise lost individuals with 
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‘a goal more ennobling than the simple accretion of power and possessions’. Religious 
ideas give these people ‘profundity and ideological clarity’.211 Shiraz Maher from ICSR 
argues something similar in his book Salafi-Jihadism, noting that Islamic State’s 
worldview is a ‘satiating ideology’ which provides its adherents with ‘a form of 
common cause, a unifying mission, and sense of purpose for bringing society 
together’.212 
 
The worldview espoused by Islamic State is a form of Salafi-jihadism. Maher 
shows that Islamic State’s ‘intellectual framework appears to sit within the 
mainstream tradition of Salafi-jihadist thought’, and that the group is ‘perhaps the 
most powerful Salafi-jihadist movement in history’.213 As a theology, Salafi-jihadism is 
centrally concerned with issues of rightful authority, legitimacy, obedience and 
rebellion. Its various streams base themselves on Salafism, a redemptive philosophy 
drawing on an idealised form of Islam with emphases on authenticity and purity, 
which is combined with violent rejection of the modern international order and 
insistence on sustained armed struggle.214 Islamic State’s Salafi-jihadist worldview is 
located at the intersection of theology and politics; just as its worldly concerns are 
mediated by and expressed through religion, so too contemporary questions of 
geopolitics and power infuse its theology. 
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This ideological base is important, but it is not the whole story. Thomas 
Hegghammer shows in Jihadi Culture: The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists 
that Salafi-jihadists have a ‘rich aesthetic culture’ which is ‘essential for 
understanding their mindset and worldview.’215 Hegghammer examines Salafi-
jihadist cultural products including poetry, music, iconography and cinematography, 
noting that ‘cultural products and practices serve as emotional persuasion tools that 
reinforce and complement the cognitive persuasion work done by doctrine … We also 
know that individuals are exposed to cultural products early in their recruitment 
trajectories, and several explicitly say they were drawn to jihadism more by the 
videos and the music than by the ideological tracts.’216 Jihadi Culture does not focus 
on Islamic State or digital proliferation of cultural products, but Hegghammer’s work 
is backed up by other studies which do. Charlie Winter’s analysis of ISIS propaganda 
notes the persistent presence of nasheeds (vocal songs with religious themes, which 
he characterizes as ‘acapella songs’), and Donald Holbrook’s 2017 study of the media 
content collected from convicted terrorists in the UK found that nasheeds were the 
most common type of foreign-language material.217 Manni Crone similarly argues in 
her analysis of the online radicalization of young European fighters by Islamic State 
that ‘religious violence in Europe today is largely enabled by aesthetic technologies of 
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the self, such as for instance jihad- and martyr-videos’.218 Juergensmeyer’s summary 
of Hegghammer makes the point succinctly: ‘the appeal of ISIS is largely a socio-
cultural attraction. Put a different way, what has enticed the many followers of ISIS in 
the region and around the world is its distinctive worldview.’219 This worldview is 
ideological and aesthetic. It is simultaneously theological and political. It provides a 
framework, a vision, and is heavily aspirational. It is religious in the thick sense of the 
term. 
 
It is possible for counter-narratives to retain the powerful moral, 
epistemological and aesthetic vision provided by Islamic State’s Salafi-jihadist 
narratives whilst undermining the conclusions they reach about normative action. 
 
Challenging the Bifurcation 
Kurt Braddock and John Horgan’s communications-based guide to the 
construction of effective counter-narratives notes that ‘One element of many 
extremist ideologies, and by extension, their adherents’ narratives, is the presence of 
binary comparisons. For example, multiple violent jihadist groups depict their 
activities as part of a struggle between ‘believers’ and ‘nonbelievers’. By representing 
their activities like this, they portray their actions as a fight between truth and 
falsehood … Counternarratives that reveal some ‘gray areas’ to these black-and-white 
portrayals may discredit them, and in the process, discredit the narratives they 
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comprise’.220 J.M. Berger argues something similar with his ‘linkage-based’ 
understanding of how Islamic State links itself with potential recruits online and 
excludes others to create two distinct groups.221 The out-group is then linked with 
crises such as the Syrian Civil War, solutions to which require the recruits to join 
forces with IS. He argues that this propaganda can be countered by dissolving the 
links constructed by Islamic State’s narratives between the recruits and IS, between 
the out-group and the crisis, or forging links between Islamic State and the crisis or 
the out-group and the recruits. 
 
Good counter-narratives do this by speaking from a religious perspective which 
appeals to the same motivational, normative and aesthetic values as Islamic State 
propaganda but re-embeds these in the modern world. They keep the religious vision 
but offer radically different perspectives about the best way it ought to be realized. 
This is demonstrable by looking at some of the most prominent counter-narrative 
campaigns from the heart of the lattice which received global political attention in EU 
issue papers, UK Home Office reports, and US Senate hearings: the Redirect Method’s 
curated videos, Abdullah-X and Average Mohamed. 
 
Average Mohamed’s YouTube videos interrogate extremist arguments and 
propaganda and argue that they cannot possible represent Islam.222  For example, in 
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‘What does the Quran have to say about suicide bombing? – English’, the eponymous 
narrator notes, ‘the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, says: ‘He who commits 
suicide by throttling himself will keep on throttling himself in the hellfire. And he who 
commits suicide by stabbing himself shall keep on stabbing himself in the hellfire 
(Sahih al-Bukhari, Hadith number 1365). What do you think happens to suicide 
bombers? You’ll be made again, blown up again, be made whole again, blown up 
again, be made whole again, blown up again, eternally in the hellfire!’ Average 
Mohamed often contrasts the horrific crimes committed by ISIS and other terrorists 
(rendered in cartoon explosions and vehicular homicides) with passages drawn from 
the Qur’an and Hadith. His content also draws extensive links between authentic 
Islam and Western citizenship in ‘Family video’, ‘Identity in Islam’ and ‘A Muslim In 
The West’. ‘Be Like Aisha’ and ‘The Bullet or the Ballot’ are examples of aspirational 
calls to action for Muslims.223 
 
Abdullah X offers a similar blend of advice, religious considerations, and 
ruminations on the role of Muslims in the modern world.224 He contrasts normative 
Islam with the actions of Islamic State in videos such as ‘Abdullah-X: ‘Road to 
Realisation’ Part 2 – Islamism’ and ‘Abdullah-X: The Real Meaning of Jihad’. His videos 
feature appeals to religious reasoning and ethics; for instance in ‘Abdullah-X: Five 
Considerations for a Muslim on Syria’ he argues, ‘Allah does not need your so-called 
‘martyrdom’ when the fight out there is about power and influence in the form of 
some manufactured jihad. Do you even know how fard al ayn [individual duty] and 
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fard al kifaya [communal duty] apply to you in your homeland and to your own 
responsibilities? Engage in relief work for those people and raise awareness; don’t go 
and find for a so-called ‘cause’ you have not even questioned critically!’ 
 
The Redirect Method pulled videos from across YouTube into playlists which it 
then promoted using paid advertising; the videos were chosen based on their 
counter-narrative potential. The English-language playlists were created by a channel 
called Upvotely which made 5 channels called ‘Beliefs of the Caliphate’, ‘Answering 
the Call’, ‘Experiencing the Caliphate’, ‘Welcome in the West?’ and ‘The Soldier’s 
Perspective’.225 Some of these videos were drawn from content producers in the 
lattice, such as Abdullah-X or the Quilliam Foundation’s ‘Not Another Brother’. Others 
came from news channels such as BBC, CNN, or Vice, and simply show ISIS losing 
territory. However, the majority came from a range of independent sources such as 
‘iLovUAllah™’, ‘IslamUnitedInshalah’, ‘TerrorismIsKufr’ and ‘MercifulServant’. They 
include sermons from respected Islamic scholars like Dr Tahir-ul-Qadri challenging 
ISIS’s jurisprudential understanding of jihad and Mufti Ismail Menk reminding 
Muslims why it is important to make dua [supplication] for their enemies. In one 
video, an old lady in Islamic State territory berates some laughing fighters, yelling ‘O 
you devils turn back to God … Go back to the way of God o grandchild’ before 
launching into a tirade about how their behaviour contradicts Islam. ‘God is watching 
what you are doing’, she warns. In ‘#MessageToISIS: Global Condemnation’, Muslims 
from around the world express their solidarity against Islamic State. ‘We have to 
write our own narrative’, one women states. ‘I would love to drop the first ‘I’ in that 
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ISIS, because there is nothing Islamic about them.’226 The most viewed videos came 
from Adam Saleh, a YouTube personality with a large following. In ‘PRAYING IN 
PUBLIC!’ and ‘MEET A MUSLIM FAMILY’ (both of which have millions of views) 
expressions of Islam are publically performed and accepted in touching displays of 
intercultural bonding on the streets of New York. These videos are examples of Islam 
being wrested back by everyday Muslims and re-embedded in the everyday contexts 
in which they live and love. 
 
These counter-narrative videos can be considered religious in the same way 
that Islamic State’s propaganda products are religious: though many of their 
messages are primarily concerned with action and conduct, the mediums in which 
they are expressed are profoundly and naturally Muslim. They refer to similar Islamic 
histories, cultural forms and theological methods of reasoning, but reach profoundly 
different conclusions from Islamic State. The Redirect Method, Abdullah-X and 
Average Mohamed have all been cited internationally as successful counter-narrative 
campaigns and emerge out a lattice of organizations with well-developed procedures 
for content creation based on current academic theory and constantly-refined best 
practices. Not all campaigns are as well-designed. 
 
The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE), headed by 
Anne Speckhard, has been interviewing ISIS defectors to create short videos which 
they disseminate as part of their ‘Breaking the ISIS Brand’ campaign.227 Speckhard et 
                                                          
226 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCVwgi-Z4YJ0LB-DpduCDFXg/playlists. Accessed 3rd May 
2018. 
227 http://www.icsve.org/isis-defectors-speak-videos/. Accessed 24th May 2018. 
76 
 
al. diverge from the communications-based counter-narrative theories offered by 
Braddock or Berger, arguing instead that ‘Most experts agree that the most effective 
tool to discredit both ISIS and their militant jihad ideology is using the voices of 
disillusioned ISIS cadres themselves (Speckhard, 2016).’228 The videos they produce 
are comprised of the most ‘damaging, denouncing, and derisive content’ from the 
interviews with the ISIS defectors; they are designed to be emotional and tough to 
watch.229 
 
ICSVE ran two pilots in which they created Facebook accounts and used them to 
share their counter-narrative videos with ISIS supporters on Facebook. In the first 
study, they targeted 77 Albanian-speaking accounts, which they befriended and 
attempted to tag in their videos. However Facebook’s counter-terrorism protocols 
shut down over half of the sample before ICSVE even uploaded their first video, and 
ICSVE’s own accounts only lasted 3 days after uploading material before being closed 
down (losing all their data in the process). In the 3 short days in which the counter-
narrative videos were available on Facebook, comments included: ‘You jealous duale 
khalifa bakijjaa we tetemedde your jealousy will kill you, dirty Munafiq, Murtad, Kufr, 
etc’; ‘Video made by kuffars and filmed in cooperation with kuffars’, and ‘Get out of 
my sight you filthy munafiq you are worse than the kuffar, only the kuffar belive in 
this, your attempts are worthless. The IS rose with Allah’s help Elhamdulilah, 
whatever fabrications you create it won’t help you achieve your goals you slave of the 
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devil’.230 (ICSVE’s paper claims ‘in a number of cases, we managed to lead our target 
audience towards constructive engagements’.) 
 
The second study attempted a similar project but with English-speaking ISIS-
supporting Facebook accounts, largely located in the UK. 231 They added nearly 50 
ISIS-supported accounts, but found their Facebook accounts disabled before they 
could upload their first video.232 Some remaining accounts were used to upload a 
Breaking the ISIS Brand video (‘A Sex Slave as a Gift for you from Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi – English Subtitles’) to a closed group of ISIS supporters which promptly 
disappeared (ICSVE doesn’t know if it was expelled, or the whole group was deleted). 
Finally, ICSVE set up some new accounts and targeted ‘fence sitters’ who appear to 
ambiguously support ISIS. At last they were able to upload a video and some pictures 
to which people reacted with ‘sad or angry faces’ and ‘comments were made 
criticizing the authenticity of the video’. ICSVE concluded that ‘our research revealed 
that our counter-narratives resonate with our target audience.’233 
 
Shocking lack of research ethics, comical execution, and ridiculous conclusions 
aside, the ICSVE counter-narrative campaigns are illuminating because of the 
vehement criticism their videos elicited. Their content was presumed fake and the 
posters were repeatedly called kuffar. This is important – the primary accusation 
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levelled against the videos was that they were the products of outsiders (either 
apostates or Americans). Instead of breaking down the bifurcation between Islamic 
State and everyone else, the ICSVE content, with its shocking images of shackled 
prisoners, children posing with AK-47s, and Islamic State defectors with hidden faces, 
reinforced this binary worldview by antagonizing the audience. 
 
The primary difference between well-designed counter-narratives and poor 
ones is that the successful counter-narratives have a religious message. They are 
therefore able to break down the absolute binary between Muslims and disbelievers 
drawn by the narratives presented by Islamic State in a way which irreligious 
counter-narratives struggle to do. Well-designed counter-narratives challenge the 
simplification of life and thought in which Islamic State is set up in direct opposition 
to the forces of disbelief and apostasy. Instead, Islam is disassociated with the violent 
actions of Islamic State and links are drawn between living according to normative 
religion and living a caring, fulfilling life in the modern world. As Average Mohamed – 
himself a firm advocate of Muslim values and the contemporary role of religion – 
concludes, ‘Peace up, extremism out.’ 
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